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Against	Institutional	Conservatism	
David	V.	Axelsen	
Department	of	Government,	LSE,	London,	United	Kingdom	
	
‘Nobody	appeared	to	have	the	least	idea	that	there	was	any	other	system	but	
the	system	to	be	considered.’	
CHARLES	DICKENS,	DAVID	COPPERFIELD	
	
Abstract	
In	 this	article,	 I	argue	against	 institutional	conservatism,	and	 the	 reluctance	 to	 include	
radical	 changes	 to	 important	 institutions	within	normative	principles	 for	 fear	of	 losing	
practical	 significance.	 In	 making	 this	 argument,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 debate	 on	 global	
justice,	in	which	the	issue	is	especially	clear	due	to	the	greater	potential	effects	of	radical	
institutional	 changes.	 My	 main	 target,	 then,	 is	 theorists	 who	 are	 institutionally	
conservative	regarding	the	institutional	system	of	nation-states	(Blake	2001,	2013;	James	
2005,	 2012;	 Risse	 2012).	 Although,	 these	 theorists	 are	 institutionally	 conservative	 for	
(somewhat)	 different	 reasons,	 they	 all	 face	 significant	 and	 potentially	 debilitating	
problems	 in	 guiding	 action	 towards	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 their	 own	moral	 commitments.	
Here,	 I	 focus	 on	 institutionally	 conservative	 arguments	 for	 (only)	 a	 low	 level	 of	 global	
redistribution.	The	problem	arises	because	the	continued	existence	of	the	current	system	
of	 nation-states	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 international	 institutions	 with	 significant	 coercive	
powers	 present	 a	 significant	 obstacle	 to	 realizing	 their	 principled	 commitment	 to	
alleviating	 the	 basic	 needs	 of	 foreigners.	 As	 I	 will	 phrase	 it	 here,	 institutionally	
conservative	theorists	end	up	in	a	dilemma,	the	escape	from	which	involves	significantly	
weakening	either	their	institutional	conservatism	or	their	normative	priorities.	
Keywords:	 global	 justice;	 institutional	 conservatism;	 nation	 states;	 global	 institutions;	
basic	needs	
	
1. Introduction	
Some	 political	 theorists	 maintain	 that	 we	 have	 good	 reasons	 not	 to	 rely	 on	 radical	
institutional	changes	when	theorizing	about	what	people	ought	to	do;	when	constructing	
normative	 principles.	 If	 we	 do,	 they	 claim,	 our	 principles	 will	 be	 unable	 to	 speak	 to	
actual	 political	 agents	 living	 their	 lives	 and	 acting	 embedded	 in	 these	 institutional	
practices.	Or,	 to	put	 it	 in	positive	 terms,	 ‘institutionally	conservative’	political	 theorists	
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hold	 that	 normative	 principles	 should	 be	 action-guiding	 in	 a	 sense	 that	 involves	 not	
straying	 too	 far	 from	 significant	 institutions	 by	 which	 the	 lives	 of	 political	 agents	 are	
currently	organized	–	or	rather,	by	which	they	are	likely	to	keep	being	organized	for	the	
foreseeable	 future.	This	 is	because,	 if	principles	stray	too	 far	 from	this	setup,	acting	on	
them	will	be	blocked	by	major	institutional	obstacles	and,	thus,	fulfilling	the	principles	
will	not	be	action-guiding	 in	a	meaningful	sense.	This,	of	course,	 is	not	the	case	 for	all	
institutions	that	currently	exist	(presumably	not,	for	example,	the	local	darts	club),	but	
only	those	that	both	play	an	important	role	in	human	lives	and	are	entrenched	in	human	
interaction.		
In	 this	article,	 I	argue	against	 institutional	conservatism,	and	 the	 reluctance	 to	 include	
radical	 changes	 to	 important	 institutions	within	normative	principles	 for	 fear	of	 losing	
practical	 significance.	 In	 making	 this	 argument,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 debate	 on	 global	
justice,	 in	 which	 the	 issue	 is	 especially	 clear	 due	 to	 the	 potential	 effects	 of	 great	
institutional	 changes.	 My	 main	 target,	 then,	 is	 theorists	 who	 are	 institutionally	
conservative	regarding	the	institutional	system	of	nation-states	(Blake	2001,	2013;	James	
2005,	 2012;	 Risse	 2012).	 Although,	 these	 theorists	 are	 institutionally	 conservative	 for	
(somewhat)	 different	 reasons,	 I	 claim	 that	 they	 all	 face	 significant	 and	 potentially	
debilitating	 problems	 in	 guiding	 action	 towards	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 their	 own	 moral	
commitments.	In	other	words,	their	principles	are	not	action-guiding	when	measured	by	
their	own	standards.	
Centering	 on	 the	 debate	 on	 global	 justice,	 I	 focus	 on	 institutionally	 conservative	
arguments	 against	 comprehensive,	 global	 redistribution	 (‘institutionally	 conservative	
non-cosmopolitanism’).	The	problem	arises,	I	claim,	because	the	continued	existence	of	
the	 current	 system	 of	 nation-states	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 international	 institutions	 with	
significant	 coercive	 powers	 present	 a	 significant	 obstacle	 to	 realizing	 their	 principled	
commitment	 to	 alleviating	 the	 basic	 needs	 of	 foreigners.	 As	 I	 will	 phrase	 it	 here,	
institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 end	 up	 in	 a	 dilemma,	 the	 escape	 from	 which	
involves	 significantly	 weakening	 either	 their	 institutional	 conservatism	 or	 their	
normative	priorities.		
The	 strength	 and	 nature	 of	 this	 dilemma	 depends	 on	 how	 conservative	 one	 is	 with	
respect	 to	 the	 current	 institutional	 system.	 It	 depends,	 for	 example,	 on	 whether	 one	
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believes	that	a	theory	can	still	be	action-guiding	even	if	it	proposes	some	radical	changes	
to	 important	 and	 entrenched	 institutions	 as	 long	 as	 the	 institutions	 themselves	 are	
preserved	or	if	no	such	changes	are	compatible	with	this	goal.	In	most	of	its	theoretical	
manifestations,	 institutional	 conservatism	 is	 most	 plausibly	 read	 as	 allowing	 for	 a	
relatively	 low	 degree	 of	 radical	 change.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 article	 and	 to	 avoid	
charges	 of	 misrepresentation,	 however,	 I	 will	 conduct	 my	 analysis	 with	 two	 different	
degrees	 of	 such	 ‘institutional	 adjustability,’	 and	 claim	 that	 even	 if	 institutional	
conservatism	were	 to	be	understood	 in	a	way	 that	allowed	 for	some	 radical	changes	 to	
current	 institutions,	 they	would	 still	 run	 into	 the	 dilemma.	 I	 do	 this	 because	 it	 is	 not	
entirely	 clear	 how	 much	 change	 is	 actually	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 institutional	
conservatism,	 and	 so,	 I	 aim	 to	 show	 that	 understanding	 institutional	 conservatism	 in	
either	of	these	two	ways	leads	to	the	dilemma	described	above.	Finally,	I	consider	some	
institutionally	conservative	replies	to	this	charge.	
The	 objections	 made	 above,	 if	 true,	 have	 important	 consequences	 for	 institutionally	
conservative	 non-cosmopolitan	 arguments	 as	 they	 seem	 obligated	 to	 recast	 their	
arguments	 or	 provide	 new	 reasons	 in	 support	 of	 their	 cause.	 To	make	 this	 argument,	
however,	some	of	the	central	concepts	upon	which	it	rests	must	first	be	explained.		
2.	Institutional	Conservatism:	facts	and	feasibility	
Institutionally	conservative	 theorists	hold	 that	normative	principles	should	be	adjusted	
to	the	way	in	which	certain,	major	institutions	currently	present	themselves	in	the	world.	
The	institutions	in	question,	which	institutionally	conservative	theorists	claim	should	be	
incorporated	in	our	principles,	are	what	I	shall	call	‘soft	facts’.	To	elaborate,	such	features	
are	‘soft’	because	they	are	based	not	on	biological	or	logical	necessities	(e.g.	that	human	
beings	need	nutrition,	 that	 squirrels	have	 tails,	or	 that	Abbey	 Road	by	The	Beatles	was	
released	 in	 1969	 –	 all	 of	 which,	 are	 ‘hard	 facts’),	 but	 are	 created	 and	 upheld	 through	
human	action.1	Note	 that	 I	 take	 this	 to	be	descriptively	neutral,	 claiming	only	 that	 soft	
facts	 are	 those	 that	 are	 contingent	 on	 human	 behavior,	 relations,	 and	 attitudes,	while	
hard	facts	are	those	that	are	not.		
Furthermore,	 they	 are	 ‘facts’	 because	while	 they	 are	upheld	by	human	action,	 they	 are	
entrenched	 in	 human	 life	—that	 is,	 they	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 everyday	 lives	 of	
many	people,	framing	and	influencing	their	choices	and	views,	and	while	they	 could	be	
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changed,	doing	so	would	require	great	effort.	Again,	I	use	this	in	a	neutral	sense,	which	is	
compatible	with	the	institutionally	conservative	understanding,	according	to	which	it	is	
very	unlikely	 that	 such	 institutions	will	 change	anytime	 soon	and	 that	doing	 so	would	
lead	to	unforeseeable	consequences.	Institutionally	conservative	theorists	emphasize	the	
importance	 of	 aligning	 normative	 principles	 with	 the	 current	 design	 of	 ‘soft	 facts’	 in	
guiding	societies	and	individuals	under	present	circumstances	(as	these	facts	are	unlikely	
to	change).		
They	might	be	contrasted	with	idealists,	who	hold	that	we	should	abstract	from	soft	facts	
when	developing	normative	principles,	emphasizing	questions	about	which	institutions	
we	ought	to	have,	regardless	of	the	current	state	of	affairs	(Caney	2005;	Tan	2004).	For	
the	purpose	of	this	article,	the	main	part	of	my	analysis	will	revolve	around	two	specific	
soft	 facts,	 to	 which	 the	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 I	 target	 all	 agree	 that	 we	
should	 adjust	 our	 theories:	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 system	 of	 strong	 nation-states	 and	 the	
absence	of	strong,	international	institutions.	
To	 elaborate	 on	 this	 methodological	 difference,	 it	 may	 be	 worth	 reflecting	 on	 a	
distinction	made	by	David	Estlund	between	theories	that	are	‘aspirational’	and	those	that	
are	 ‘concessive’	 (Estlund	 2008,	 Chap.	 9;	 Hamlin	 &	 Stemplowska	 2012).	 These	 theories	
differ	not	in	whether	their	requirements	would	ever	be	fulfilled,	but	in	the	plausibility	of	
this	 happening	 and	 epistemic	 certainty	 of	 the	 outcome	 if	 it	 does	 given	 the	 current	
context,	 and	 in	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 adjust	 to	 such	 factors.	 Concessive	 theories	 concede	
certain	 (soft)	 facts	 about	 people,	 institutions,	 and	 societies,	 and	how	 they	 are	 likely	 to	
work	 and	 act	 and	 continue	 to	 work	 and	 act.	 Thus,	 for	 example,	 a	 concessive	 theorist	
might	claim	that	we	will	most	likely	continue	to	have	nation-states	and	know	little	about	
alternative	 setups,	 and	 that,	 due	 to	 the	 improbability	 of	 this	 changing	 we	 should	
construct	normative	principles	using	this	as	a	pretheoretical	assumption.	Institutionally	
conservative	theorists	advocate	concessive	principles.		
Aspirational	theories,	on	the	other	hand,	are	not	adjusted	to	soft	facts	that	are	likely	to	
endure,	and	set	up	principles	 that	people	ought	to	 live	up	to	even	 if	 they	are	currently	
not	complying	and	are	unlikely	to	do	so	(due	to	these	soft	facts).	This	is	the	position	held	
by	idealists	from	which	institutional	conservatives	distance	themselves.	Importantly,	for	
understanding	 this	 criticism,	 aspirational	 theories	 do	not	 set	 standards	 that	cannot	 be	
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met,	 although	 they	 may	 set	 ones	 that	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 met	 given	 that	 they	 are	 not	
adjusted	to	how	people	and	institutions	currently	work	and	act.2		
In	 this	 article,	 I	 will	 claim	 that	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 (and	 particularly,	
institutionally	conservative	non-cosmopolitans)	propose	principles	that	are	infeasible	in	
exactly	 the	 sense	 that	 their	 achievement	 is	 unlikely	 in	 any	 immediate	 future,	 and	 that	
this	is	due	to	the	static	role	they	ascribe	to	soft	facts	in	their	action-guidance.3		
Concessive	 theorists,	 as	 the	 institutionally	 conservative	 ones	 examined	 in	 this	 article,	
concede	 the	 institutional	 setup	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 the	 feasibility	 and	 epistemic	
reliability	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	 their	 principles	 –	 and	 claim	 that	 only	 principles	
which	are	implementable	in	this	way	can	be	action-guiding.	Idealists,	on	the	other	hand,	
concede	 hard	 facts,	 but	 not	 soft	 ones	 when	 establishing	 normative	 principles.	 Idealist	
principles	 are	 not	 action-guiding	 according	 to	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists,	
because	 the	 implementation	 of	 their	 principles	 is	 infeasible	 given	 the	 current	 political	
and	social	context.		
This	 infeasibility	should	be	understood	 in	a	broad	sense	as	meaning	both	that	political	
agents	are	unable	to	act	on	idealist	principles	since	the	actions	prescribed	are	obstructed	
by	weighty	political	 and	 institutional	obstacles	 and	 that	 such	principles	 involve	 a	high	
degree	 of	 epistemic	 uncertainty	 (or	 lack	 of	 assurance),	 which	 entails	 that	 the	 risk	
involved	makes	them	infeasible	for	agents	to	act	upon	(Blake	2001,	262,	2013,	4	and	112;	
and	James	2012,	chap.	4,	2013,	58-59;	Risse	2012,	chap.	16,	respectively).	As	mentioned,	I	
will	 show	 that	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 fail	 to	 live	 up	 to	 this	 desideratum	
themselves.		
While	these	approaches	differ	in	their	justifications	for	institutional	conservatism	(I	will	
spell	out	and	analyze	these	differences	below),	they	converge	on	two	elements	which	are	
the	ones	 that	are	 important	 for	 this	analysis:	 they	agree	 that	 theorists	 should	 treat	 the	
current	 setup	 of	 nation-states	 as	 a	 given,	 and	 that	 we	 have	 basic	 obligations	 to	 poor	
foreigners.	 And	 they	 do	 so	 because	 abstracting	 from	 these	 facts	 would	 make	 their	
theories	 non-action-guiding.	 I	 will	 argue,	 however,	 that	 institutionally	 conservative	
theorists	cannot	avoid	the	action-guidance	problems	they	ascribe	to	ideal	theorists	and	
that	they	are,	in	fact,	subject	to	their	own	critique.		
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3.	Institutionally	Conservative	Non-cosmopolitanism	
As	 mentioned,	 I	 will	 exemplify	 my	 more	 general	 point	 by	 focusing	 on	 institutional	
conservatism	 in	 the	 debate	 on	 global	 justice.	 More	 specifically,	 since	 institutionally	
conservative	 theorists	 almost	 exclusively	 sit	 on	 one	 side	 of	 the	 global	 justice	 debate	
chamber,	 I	 will	 be	 concerned	 with	 theories	 of	 non-cosmopolitanism,	 as	 opposed	 to	
cosmopolitan	theories.	I	shall	use	‘non-cosmopolitan’	to	describe	theories	that	hold	that	
our	 only	 positive	 obligations	 to	 non-compatriots	 are	 to	 ensure	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 the	
means	 to	a	minimally	decent	 life	or	their	basic	 needs	while	our	redistributive	duties	 to	
compatriots	 are	 significantly	 stronger.4	I	will	 use	 ‘cosmopolitan,’	 on	 the	other	hand,	 to	
describe	 theories	 that	 claim	 that	 our	 positive	 obligations	 to	 poor	 foreigners	 involve	
securing	significantly	more	than	basic	needs	fulfillment—i.e.	human	flourishing,	equality	
of	opportunity,	or	raising	everyone	above	a	high	threshold	of	sufficiency.		
Institutionally	conservative	non-cosmopolitan	theories	hold	both	a	methodological	point	
and	 an	 implicit	 (and	 indeed	 often	 explicit),	 substantive	 critique	 of	 cosmopolitan	
theorists.	 From	 the	 institutionally	 conservative	 point	 of	 view,	 then,	 cosmopolitan	
theorists	are	seen	as	asserting	principles	that	are	methodologically	unable	to	guide	actual	
political	 action	 (although,	 as	 we	 saw,	 it	 is	 more	 precise	 to	 say	 that	 they	 do	 so	 in	 an	
aspirational	way),	since	they	are	not	informed	by	current	social	practices	to	a	sufficient	
degree.	 If	we	wish	 to	offer	present-day	guidance	 to	agents	 in	 such	circumstances,	 they	
claim,	 we	must	 adjust	 our	 normative	 principles	 to	 this	 reality.	 And	 this	 is,	 to	 a	 large	
extent,	 why	 the	 substantive	 conclusions	 reached	 by	 cosmopolitans	 about	 our	 strong,	
redistributive	obligations	to	non-compatriots	are	seen	as	misguided	(Blake	2001,	261-266,	
2013,	44-49;	James	2012,	chap.	4;	and	Risse	2012,	chap.	16).5		
Note	here	that	I	am	not	disputing	the	normative	criterion	that	we	owe	only	basic	need	
fulfilment	to	foreigners,	the	empirical	one	claiming	that	this	criterion	actually	pertains	to	
the	 global	 sphere	 due	 to	 its	 current	 setup,	 nor	 the	 notion	 that	 normative	 principles	
should	be	action-guiding	in	the	sense	favored	by	institutional	conservatives.6	Instead,	my	
claim	is	that	conceding	these	particular	institutional	soft	facts	in	one’s	theories	with	the	
purpose	of	guiding	political	action	is	at	odds	with	attempting	to	guide	action	towards	the	
fulfilment	of	basic	obligations	to	foreigners.		
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Recall	 that	 this	 is	with	 the	 institutionally	conservative	understanding	of	action-guiding	
in	mind.	On	this	view,	principles	are	not	action-guiding	when	the	actions	they	prescribe	
are	 obstructed	 by	 weighty	 political	 and	 institutional	 obstacles.	 Institutional	
conservatism,	thus,	conflicts	with	non-cosmopolitan	obligations	to	fulfill	basic	needs	in	
exactly	 this	 way;	 the	 continued	 existence	 of	 strong	 nation	 states	 and	 the	 absence	 of	
strong,	international	institutions	constitute	weighty	obstacles	to	the	universal	fulfillment	
of	 basic	 needs.	 This	 constitutes	 a	 dilemma,	 and	 escaping	 this	 (and	 avoiding	
incoherence),	entails	choosing	one	of	two	options.		
Either,	 they	 can	 insist	 on	 institutional	 conservatism	 and	 concede	 the	 existence	 and	
absence	 of	 the	 relevant	 institutions	 in	 their	 principles	 (allowing	 for	 either	 of	 the	 two	
degrees	of	 institutional	 adjustability	mentioned	below).	This	way,	 they	 can	uphold	 the	
argument	 that	 their	 theories	 are	more	 closely	 aligned	with	 present-day	 circumstances,	
and	thus,	better	able	to	guide	political	action	than	idealist,	cosmopolitan	theories,	which	
abstract	from	such	features.	However,	by	insisting	on	institutional	conservatism,	as	I	will	
show,	they	must	renounce	being	action-guiding	regarding	basic	obligations	towards	poor	
foreigners	 as	 this	 is	 infeasible	 by	 their	 own	 standards,	 exposing	 themselves	 to	 the	
critique	that	their	view	is	implausibly	dismissive	on	this	point.	
Alternatively,	 they	 can	 stand	 firm	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 their	 self-professed	 goal	 of	
alleviating	basic	needs	deficiencies.	But	guiding	action	towards	this	would	mean	severely	
weakening	 their	 constraints	 on	 which	 principles	 should	 be	 proposed,	 and	 thus,	
weakening	their	action-guidance	argument	against	cosmopolitans.	If	non-cosmopolitans	
choose	this	second	horn	of	the	dilemma,	they	are	able	to	coherently	maintain	their	claim	
that	we	have	action-guiding	basic	obligations	to	poor	foreigners	–	that	is,	ones	that	are	
not	 obstructed	 by	 weighty	 political	 and	 institutional	 obstacles	 –	 but	 at	 the	 cost	 of	
weakening	 the	 maxim	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 their	 critique	 of	 cosmopolitanism	 considerably;	
that	normative	principles	must	be	adjusted	to	the	present	setup	of	institutions	in	order	
to	actually	guide	action.		
3.1.	Institutional	non-cosmopolitanism	
One	cluster	of	non-cosmopolitan	theorists	grounds	their	arguments	in	the	way	in	which	
institutions	 are	 structured	 and	 arranged.	 We	 might	 call	 this	 type	 of	 argument	 an	
institutional	disanalogy	argument,	arguing	 that	 the	domestic	and	 the	global	 sphere	are	
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non-analogous	 with	 respect	 to	 obligations	 of	 justice	 (Caney	 2001,	 118).	 Not	 all	 such	
arguments	are	explicitly	institutionally	conservative,	however,	so	for	the	purpose	of	this	
paper,	I	focus	on	the	accounts	of	Michael	Blake	(2001	and	2012),	Mathias	Risse	(2006	and	
2012),	and	Aaron	James	(2005,	2012,	and	2013).	In	the	outline	below,	I	attempt	to	depict	
the	commonalities	of	these	three	accounts	in	order	to	make	it	(and	my	ensuing	criticism)	
representative	of	the	broader	group	of	institutionally	based	non-cosmopolitan	theories.	I	
take	 it,	 however,	 that	 my	 analysis	 can	 bring	 important	 insights	 regarding	 many	 non-
cosmopolitan	accounts	that	rely	more	 implicitly	on	conservative	assumptions	about	the	
current	 institutional	 setup,	 suggesting	 that	 they	 ought	 to	 explicitly	 reject	 institutional	
conservatism.7		
Institutional	 non-cosmopolitans	 generally	 affirm	 the	 non-cosmopolitan	 tenet	 that	 our	
redistributive	 obligations	 to	 compatriots	 are	 comprehensive	 (giving	 rise	 to	 a	 concern	
with	relative	deprivation),	while	our	global	redistributive	obligations	are	only	at	a	basic	
level,	 claiming	 that:	 ‘There	 is,	 I	 think,	 a	 threshold	 to	decent	human	 functioning	 [...]	 It	
seems	to	be	a	matter	of	moral	gravity	whenever	we	might	prevent	someone	from	falling	
below	that	 line	and	fail	 to	do	so.’	 (Blake	2001,	260.	See	also	Blake	2013,	80,	 James	2005,	
Risse	 2012,	 chap.	 2).	 Although	 the	 theories	 differ	 somewhat	 in	 their	 specifics,	 they	
converge	on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	difference	 is	 due	 to	people	 sharing	 a	 state,	which	places	
them	 in	 a	 particular	 relationship.	 A	 relationship,	 in	 which	 the	 state	 is	 charged	 with	
ensuring	that	its	citizens	have	the	possibility	of	pursuing	good,	autonomous	lives,	thus,	
playing	an	especially	significant	role	in	people’s	prospects.	No	institutions	on	the	global	
stage	 have	 comparable	 significance.	 It	 is	 this	 normative	 property;	 that	 people	 are	 co-
engaged	 in	 relations	 that	 ensure	 their	 possibility	 of	 pursuing	 autonomous	 lives,	which	
makes	obligations	between	co-citizens	comprehensive	–	and	it	is	the	lack	of	this	feature	
that	makes	obligations	between	non-citizens	merely	basic.		
To	 spell	 this	 out,	 Blake	holds	 that	 there	 is,	 then,	 an	 important	difference	between	 the	
national	 and	 the	 global	 realm	 in	 that	 national	 institutions	 coerce	 their	 citizens—or	
rather,	the	citizens	of	a	(democratic)	nation	coerce	each	other	 in	a	way	that	potentially	
undermines	autonomy	(Blake	2001,	265	&	279-282,	2013,	91-94	&	102-107).	Some	form	of	
institutional	coercion	is	necessary,	however,	since	it	makes	autonomous	lives	possible	by	
upholding	 a	 just	 system	 of	 rules	 and	 laws,	 which	 ‘seem	 necessary	 for	 the	 settled	
expectations	 without	 which	 autonomy	 is	 denied’	 (Blake	 2001,	 280). 8 	To	 avoid	 that	
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domestic	coercion	undermines	autonomy,	co-citizens	have	a	special	claim	on	each	other	
for	a	system	of	law	and	a	distributive	scheme	that	can	justify	the	coercion	that	upholds	
it—i.e.	one	 that	 is	 concerned	with	 relative	deprivation.	Under	 the	current	 institutional	
order,	 such	 justification	 is	 possible	 since	 nation-states	 can	 promote	 autonomy	 due	 to	
their	inescapable	impact	on	their	inhabitants	and	relatively	effective	enforcement.		
On	 James’	 account,	 the	 obligations	 that	 arise	 internationally	 stem	 from	 economic	
interactions	 across	 borders,	 which	 are	 embedded	 in	 the	 nation-state	 system.	 Nation-
states	 engage	 in	 international	 economic	 relations	 with	 an	 expectance	 of	 mutual	
economic	gains,	and	it	is	because	of	this	relation	that	international	obligations	emerge	–	
an	obligation,	that	is,	that	such	gains	are	distributed	fairly.	The	global	economy	is	not	‘a	
well-integrated	market	akin	to	advanced-country	economies,	and,	for	all	we	now	know,	
it	may	never	become	one’	(James	2012,	22).	More	fundamentally,	it	is	not	the	same	kind	
of	 practice	 as	 the	 one	 that	 is	 present	 in	 the	 domestic	 sphere,	 the	 goal	 of	 which	 is	 to	
create	primary	social	goods	(James	2005,	300,	2012,	15).	For	James,	it	is	the	different	logics	
and	aims	of	the	two	practices	that	render	the	ensuing	obligations	different	–	in	one,	the	
purpose	is	to	enable	autonomous	living	and	in	the	other,	the	purpose	is	to	create	mutual	
economic	gains.	
Finally,	 Risse	 claims	 that	 both	 coercive	 threats	 to	 autonomy	 and	 reciprocity	 are	
important,	 but	 that	 it	 must	 be	 supplemented	 by	 nonvoluntariness.	 What	 creates	
comprehensive	obligations	between	co-citizens	is	the	existence	of	all	these	factors;	joint	
coercion,	reciprocal	provision	of	central	goods,	and	nonvoluntariness	(Risse	2012,	chap.	
3).9	He	adds	that	a	just	world	need	not	entail	equality	across	countries	and	could,	indeed,	
be	as	unequal	as	ours	(Risse	2012,	281).		
Although	 these	 accounts	 differ	 in	 their	 particulars,	 they	 agree	 that	 what	 triggers	
comprehensive	obligations	between	co-citizens	is	the	joint	participation	in	relations	that	
are	 especially	 impactful	 on	 their	 possibilities	 of	 leading	 autonomous	 lives.	 For	 this	
reason,	citizens	owe	more	to	each	other.	They	share	a	strong,	 institutional	relation,	one	
might	say.	 In	all	 the	mentioned	accounts,	 the	 lack	of	a	similarly	 intrusive,	 institutional	
structure	on	the	global	level	entails	that	an	equivalently	justifiable	concern	with	relative	
shares	 is	 not	 needed	 here.10	They	 share	 only	 a	weak,	 institutional	 relation.	Hence,	 our	
only	 concern	 regarding	 non-compatriots	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 their	 autonomy	 is	 not	
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undermined	by	absolute	poverty	(Blake	2001,	294).11	Finally,	 these	accounts	all	 share	an	
institutionally	conservative	approach,	in	that	they	base	their	theories	on	the	capacities	of	
the	present	institutions	within	these	two	realms	to	actualize	(and	enforce)	a	distributive	
scheme.		
Blake	 explicitly	 refers	 to	 this	 approach	 as	 ‘institutional	 conservatism,’	 which	 involves	
holding	 the	 current	 levels	 of	 institutional	 coercion	 constant,	 and	 showing	 how	 such	
institutions	can	be	justified	(Blake	2013,	45-48,	2001,	262).	More	precisely,	Blake	adjusts	
his	 theory	 to	 the	 facts	 of	 (unequal)	 state	 power;	 the	 division	 of	 territorial	 jurisdiction	
found	 today;	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 international	 institutions,	 in	 contrast,	 do	not	 engage	 in	
‘direct	coercion	against	individuals’	and	can	be	ignored	by	stronger	states.	He	does	not,	
then,	 ask	which	 institutions	we	ought	 to	 have	 but	 takes	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 current	
coercive	structures	as	assumptions,	on	the	basis	of	which	we	may	determine	what	is	just.	
Although	 the	 institutionally	 conservative	 theories	 differ	 somewhat	 about	 how	 to	 treat	
intermediate	 institutions	(such	as	the	EU)	on	their	approach,	they	agree	that	we	should	
treat	 the	existence	of	 strong	nation-states	 and	 the	 lack	of	 similarly	 strong	 institutional	
relations	with	global	 reach	as	pretheoretical	assumptions	 (James	2012,	chap.	 1,	2013,	58;	
Risse	2012,	chap.	15-17).	These	two	institutional	features,	however,	are	exactly	the	ones	I	
will	 claim	make	 their	 approach	 incompatible	with	 action-guidance	 towards	 alleviating	
basic	needs.	
A	 cosmopolitan	 skeptic	 might,	 of	 course,	 ask	 if	 we	 could	 not	 simply	 set	 up	 strong	
institutions	 globally,	 thereby	 acquiring	 comprehensive	 duties	 towards	 foreigners.	
Institutionally	conservative	theorists,	however,	reject	that	move	–	and	this	is	exactly	the	
crux	of	their	approach.	Blake,	for	example,	holds	that	only	in	cases	in	which	coercion	is	
needed	to	 increase	autonomy	can	this	be	 justified.	Since	the	world	 is	currently	divided	
into	 states	 with	 unequal	 capacities,	 some	 of	 which	 are	 powerful	 enough	 to	 ignore	
international	law,	international	coercion	would	not	increase	autonomy.	Thus,	we	should	
assume,	or	concede,	the	existence	of	the	state	system	and	the	lack	of	strong	international	
institutions.	
James	builds	his	institutional	conservatism	around	the	notion	of	assurance.	In	order	for	
individuals	 to	be	motivated	 to	 risk	engaging	 in	cooperative	ventures,	 they	must	have	a	
measure	 of	 assurance	 that	 others	 will	 do	 their	 part	 and	 make	 the	 risk	 worthwhile.	
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Assurance	can	never	be	complete	but	is	increased	when	the	expectations	that	others	will	
comply	 are	 increased	 –	which	 is	 influenced	by	 the	 existence	 of	 common	 social	 norms,	
laws,	 institutional	 enforcement,	 and	 expectations.	 In	 the	 current	 global	 order,	 agents	
generally	have	the	assurance	needed	to	engage	in	international	trade	relations.	But	this	
would	not	 be	 the	 case,	 if	 it	was	 fundamentally	 altered.	We	must,	 then,	 ‘take	 the	 state	
system	 for	 granted	 for	 lack	 of	 a	 feasible,	 reasonably	 well-assured	 alternative	 for	 the	
management	 of	 global	 affairs’	 (James	 2012,	 22).	 More	 specifically,	 we	 cannot	 know	
whether	 the	 required	 level	 of	 assurance	 would	 be	 present	 and,	 importantly,	 the	
assurance	needed	for	people	to	be	motivated	to	cooperate	to	make	this	change	–	to	make	
this	different	global	order	come	about	–	is	not	present	due	to	the	mere	unpredictability	
of	this	alternative	(James	2012,	chap.	4).	
Similarly,	 Risse	 draws	 on	 the	 epistemic	 uncertainty	 regarding	 what	 a	 world	 without	
nation-state	institutions	would	look	like,	and	claims	to	deliver	a	‘sweeping	objection’	to	
the	 cosmopolitan	notion	 of	 stripping	 down	 the	 system	of	 nation	 states	 or	 establishing	
strong,	global	institutions	with	the	capacity	of	current	states.	Theorizing	an	alternative,	
he	claims,	 is	 infeasible	because	the	risk	and	uncertainty	 involved	 is	 too	great.	They	are	
both	 ‘too	 radical’	 and	we	cannot	 ‘credibly	assert	 that	we	 should	gradually	approximate	
this	 goal	 because	 we	 do	 not	 understand	 the	 goal	 itself	 well	 enough	 to	 aspire	 at	
approximation’	 (Risse	2012,	323).	Both	 James	and	Risse,	 then,	ground	their	 institutional	
conservatism	 in	 epistemic	 uncertainty.	 Risse’s	 account,	 however,	 starts	 from	 the	
perspective	of	 institution-building	whereas	James’	begins	from	the	agents	acting	within	
these	prospective	institutions.	
Note	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 strong	 nation	 states	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 strong,	 international	
institutions	 are	 soft	 facts	 as	 described	 above—i.e.	 they	 are	 entrenched,	 but	 upheld	 by	
human	 action.	 Furthermore,	 their	 conception	 of	 how	 theories	 should	 guide	 political	
action	is	concessive,	since	they	adjust	their	theory	to	facts	to	increase	compliance	(Blake	
2013,	 45,	 47,	 and	 104).	 The	 reason	 that	 is	 given	 for	 this	 methodological	 choice	 is	 the	
ability	 of	 such	 an	 approach	 to	 better	 guide	 political	 action	 in	 the	 current	 world	
compared	to	more	ideal	approaches	(Blake	2001,	262,	2013,	4	and	112;	James	2012,	chap.	4;	
Risse	 2012,	 chap.	 15	 and	 16).	 And	 while	 there	 are	 differences	 between	 the	 specific	
approaches,	 the	 dual	 goal	 of	 guiding	 actual	 political	 agents	 without	 abstracting	 from	
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institutional	 circumstances	 and	 fulfilling	 basic	 obligations	 to	 foreigners	 are	 repeated.	
This,	then,	is	the	core	of	the	institutionally	conservative	non-cosmopolitan	position.	
4.	The	non-cosmopolitan	dilemma	
Let	us	look	at	the	claims	made	by	institutionally	conservative	non-cosmopolitans	from	a	
more	 panoramic	 perspective.	 As	mentioned,	 their	 non-cosmopolitan	 stance	 holds	 that	
we	have	moral	obligations	to	fulfill	the	basic	needs	of	and	ensure	a	minimally	decent	life	
for	non-compatriots	(or	at	least	that	they	have	a	moral	claim	on	us,	as	a	group,	to	have	
these	needs	met).	At	present,	 almost	 2.5	 billion	people	 live	below	 the	 2	dollar	 per	day	
poverty	line,	hundreds	of	millions	are	undernourished	and	almost	50,000	people	die	each	
day	from	poverty-related	causes—and	all	this	in	a	time	of	increased	global	wealth.	Thus,	
one	 can	 safely	 conclude	 that	we	 are	 a	 long	way	 from	 a	world	 that	 non-cosmopolitans	
would	 label	 as	 just,	 since	 the	 basic	 needs	 of	 foreigners	 are	 not	 (at	 all)	 fulfilled. 12	
Furthermore,	meeting	 even	 the	 relatively	minimal	 obligations	 that	 non-cosmopolitans	
embrace	 would	 require	 significant	 changes	 to	 current	 levels	 of	 global	 redistribution.	
Even	by	non-cosmopolitan	standards,	then,	the	current	distribution	is	unjust	and	we	are	
not	doing	enough	to	change	this	(i.e.	we	have	unfulfilled	basic	obligations	to	foreigners,	
and	 fulfilling	 them	 involves	doing	much	more	 than	we	are	 currently	doing	 to	 alleviate	
deprivation	and	need).		
One	might	interject	and	claim	that	alleviating	world	poverty	is	not,	in	fact,	very	difficult,	
nor	very	costly	(among	others,	this	claim	is	put	forward	by	Pogge	(2008)).	If	this	were	the	
case,	of	 course,	a	world	 in	which	basic	needs	were	universally	 fulfilled	 seems	 relatively	
easily	accessible	and	guiding	action	towards	this	end	does	not	seem	to	be	out	of	reach	for	
institutionally	conservative	theorists.	However,	non-cosmopolitans	in	general,	and	Blake	
and	Risse	 in	 particular,	 dismiss	 this	 claim.13	Furthermore,	when	Pogge	 speaks	 of	world	
poverty	alleviation	as	not	being	very	costly,	he	often	means	in	purely	monetary	terms,	as	
in;	the	shortfall	needed	to	bring	the	global	poor	above	the	absolute	poverty	line	does	not	
constitute	a	very	great	proportion	of	the	GDP	of	wealthy	countries	(2008,	10).	And	often,	
it	 is	 on	 these	 grounds	 that	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 dismiss	 his	 claims;	 as	
underestimating	the	extent	of	the	institutional	improvements	necessary	(Risse	2012,	290-
294).14	On	institutionally	conservative	accounts,	alleviating	basic	need	deficiencies	is	not,	
tellingly,	easy	or	uncostly.		
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Cosmopolitans	might	complain	that	institutional	conservatism,	generally,	does	not	give	
adequate	attention	 to	 this	 transformative	process—that	 they	are	not	 sufficiently	 intent	
on	 showing	 how	 to	 get	 to	 the	 target	 they	 propose	 (which	 I	 take	 to	 be	 a	 fair	 point	 of	
criticism	in	itself).15	Now,	obviously	some	 form	of	change	is	needed	if	we	are	to	achieve	
global	 justice.	And,	 indeed,	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 are	 not	 concessive	on	
this	 point;	 they	 do	 not	 think	 that	 we	 should	 take	 the	 existence	 of	 injustices	 as	 a	
pretheoretical	fact	to	which	we	should	adjust	our	theories.	In	other	words,	they	do	take	
such	 injustices	 (e.g.	 instances	 of	 severe	 poverty)	 to	 be	 objects	 of	 potential	 political	
change.	 This	 follows	 implicitly	 from	 their	 treating	 injustices	 such	 as	 basic	 needs	
deprivations	 as	 something	 that	must	be	 eliminated	 (and	 thus,	can	 be	 eliminated),	 and	
follows	directly	from	their	methodological	approach,	which	is	explicitly	oriented	toward	
guiding	 political	 action	 (and	 hence,	 supposedly	 points	 to	 plausible	 goals	 of	 such	
potential	action).		
I	 claim	 that	 the	 basic	 needs	 fulfillment	 required	 by	 institutionally	 conservative	 non-
cosmopolitans	 is	 implausible	 or	 unlikely	 without	 changing	 the	 current	 institutional	
setup.	 Since	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 are	 limited	 to	 developing	 principles	
from	within	 a	 framework	 in	 which	 these	 facts	 are	 left	 (relatively)	 unchanged,	 guiding	
action	(in	the	sense	of	action	being	unobstructed	by	major	obstacles)	toward	basic	rights	
fulfilment	is	beyond	the	scope	of	their	theories.		
As	 mentioned,	 however,	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 are	 not	 entirely	 explicit	
about	what	 adjusting	 one’s	 theories	 to	 soft	 facts	actually	 involves	 –	 that	 is,	how	much	
institutions	might	be	changed	without	undermining	the	possibilities	for	action-guidance.	
These	 authors,	 then,	 are	 indeterminate	 regarding	 whether	 the	 state	 system	 is	 to	 be	
retained	more	or	less	in	its	current	form	or	whether	all	that	is	needed	is	some	system	of	
units	 with	 sovereign	 and	 special	 territorial	 jurisdiction	 and	 responsibility.16	For	 this	
reason,	I	will	target	institutional	conservatism	at	two	different	degrees	of	abstraction,	the	
first	 targeting	 the	most	 static	 conception.	 In	both	 cases,	 I	 claim,	non-cosmopolitanism	
becomes	 subject	 to	 the	 dilemma	 between	 institutional	 conservatism	 and	 basic	 needs	
alleviation.	
Firstly,	 taking	 the	 institutional	 setup	more	or	 less	 as	 it	 is	without	 radical,	 institutional	
changes,	 I	 will	 show	 that	 non-cosmopolitans	 are	 oblivious	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	
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existence	of	strong	nation	states	undermines	(or	may	undermine)	the	fulfillment	of	basic	
obligations	owed	to	foreigners	globally.	The	current	institutional	setup,	then,	is	working	
heavily	against	the	fulfillment	of	basic	needs	and	rights	–	it,	in	effect,	constitutes	a	major	
obstacle	 to	 achieving	 this	 goal.	Conceding	 this	means	 treating	 injustices	 regarding	our	
basic	 obligations	 to	 foreigners	 inherent	 in	 these	 institutions	 as	 a	 given.	 Therefore,	
institutional	 conservatism	 problematically	 opposes	 guiding	 action	 towards	 the	
fulfillment	of	basic	needs	at	the	outset.		
Secondly,	one	might	understand	institutional	conservatism	as	allowing	for	some	radical	
changes	to	the	current	institutional	setup	–	but	without	abandoning	a	system	of	strong	
nation-states	 and	 without	 constructing	 strong,	 international	 institutions	 (James’	
account,	 of	 the	 three,	 is	most	 plausibly	 read	 as	 allowing	 for	 this).	 However,	 the	most	
promising	 (perhaps	 only)	 ways	 of	 making	 universal	 basic	 needs	 fulfilment	 plausible	
require	 the	 establishment	 of	 strong,	 international	 institutions	 and	 the	 weakening	 the	
system	of	nation	states	to	a	point	well	beyond	what	such	a	reading	would	allow.	To	show	
this,	I	look	at	different	ways	through	which	we	may	come	to	increase	the	plausibility	of	
fulfilling	 basic	 needs	 within	 a	 reasonable	 timeframe,	 and	 show	 that	 these	 involve	
establishing	 strong	 international	 institutions	 or	weakening	 the	 system	of	 nation	 states	
very	 significantly.	 Making	 basic	 obligations	 fulfilment	 plausibly	 achievable,	 then,	
requires	changing	the	soft	facts	that	non-cosmopolitans	concede	pre-theoretically.		
Note	 that,	 although	 my	 analysis	 is	 primarily	 exemplified	 by	 way	 of	 the	 global	 justice	
debate,	 I	 take	 these	points	of	criticism	to	be	generally	applicable	 to	 theories	which	are	
institutionally	conservative	–	or,	at	the	very	least,	as	pointing	out	some	problems	that	all	
such	 theories	 face.	 Institutionally	 conservative	 theories,	 then,	must	 always	 be	 wary	 of	
conceding	injustices	inherent	in	the	system	and	of	placing	the	most	plausible	(or,	even,	
the	only	plausible)	routes	to	overcoming	injustice	beyond	their	scope	of	action-guidance.	
The	 two	objections	 target	 institutional	 conservatism	 at	 two	different	 levels	 of	 soft	 fact	
accommodation	and	institutional	adjustability.	Below,	I	will	specify	these	objections	and	
briefly	 reflect	on	how	 these	points	may	be	generalized	 to	 institutional	 conservatism	 in	
other	fields	of	moral	and	political	philosophy.	
4.1.	Can	we	eliminate	poverty	without	institutional	change?	
A.	INSTITUTIONAL	CONSERVATISM	WITH	NO	RADICAL	CHANGES	TO	MAJOR	INSTITUTIONS	
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The	institutionally	conservative	approach,	first,	may	be	understood	as	claiming	that	the	
system	of	nation	states	and	the	comparative	weakness	of	the	international	 institutional	
setup	 must	 be	 conceded	 without	 any	 radical	 changes.	 This,	 however,	 places	 non-
cosmopolitans	in	a	dilemma	is	by	making	their	principles	oblivious	to	injustices	inherent	
in	 the	 institutional	 setup.	Understood	 this	way,	 institutional	 conservatism	prescribes	 a	
relatively	 static	 view	 of	 major	 institutional	 features	 of	 the	 world	 and	 a	 low	 level	 of	
institutional	adjustability.		
As	several	theorists	have	pointed	out,	however,	the	present	global	institutional	order	has	
deeply	 unjust	 consequences	 for	 the	 poorest	 of	 the	 world,	 effectively	 worsening	 or	
maintaining	 their	 deprivation.	 Thomas	 Pogge,	 for	 example,	 shows	 how	 international	
institutions	create	incentives	for	coups	d’état,	help	dictators	uphold	oppressive	regimes,	
and	worsen	the	prospects	for	democracy	by	giving	privileges	to	state	leaders	regardless	of	
the	 democratic	 legitimacy	 of	 their	 authority.	 The	 problem	 is	 effectively	 created	 by	 the	
lack	of	strong	institutionalized	coercion	and	reciprocal	relations	within	the	international	
system	(Pogge	2008,	13-32,	118-122,	145-150,	158).17		
This	 highlights	 a	 related	 problem,	 namely	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 strong,	 international	
structures	 is	 especially	 harmful	 to	 poor	 countries	 that	 lack	 the	 capacity	 to	 coercively	
control	 the	 actions	 of	 their	 citizens	 themselves	 (Collier	 2010,	 chap.	 9).	 This,	 in	 turn,	
means	 that	 gains	 from	 trade	 or	 investments	 that	 could	 have	 been	 spent	 on	 freeing	
citizens	from	basic	rights	deficiencies	are	often	siphoned	out	of	the	country,	since	poor	
governments	are	unable	 to	coerce	citizens	and	trade	effectively	 (Beitz	 1999,	 147-149).	 If	
we	adjust	our	 theories	 to	 this	 lack	of	 strong,	 international	 structures,	 treating	 them	as	
pretheoretical	 assumptions	 (as	 institutionally	 conservative	 non-cosmopolitans	 do),	 we	
cannot	 guide	 political	 action	 towards	 rectifying	 the	 basic	 rights	 deficiencies	 caused	 by	
their	very	absence.		
Furthermore,	 the	 inequality	 between	 states	 (which	 is	 also	 explicitly	 conceded	 to	 both	
exist	 and	 continue	 to	 exist	 by	 both	 Blake	 (2013,	 45-46)	 and	 Risse	 (2012,	 281-282))	 in	
wealth,	know-how,	and	institutional	capacities	translates	into	vast	differences	in	leverage	
and	 insight	 in	bargaining	 situations,	which	 results	 in	 trade	agreements	 that	 leave	poor	
countries	 with	much	 less	 than	 their	 fair	 share	 (even	 by	 non-cosmopolitan	 standards),	
and	which	may	 even	 exacerbate	poverty	 (Caney	 2005,	 172,	Pogge	 2008,	 9,	 16,	 27,	 133).18	
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These	 inequalities	 need	 not	 necessarily	 translate	 into	 unequal	 bargaining	 power,	 but	
rather	do	so	due	to	the	 lack	of	strong	international	structures	and	the	ensuing	failure	to	
enforce	 (more)	 equal	 bargaining	 positions. 19 	Again,	 the	 soft	 facts	 assumed	 by	
institutionally	conservative	non-cosmopolitans	serve	to	uphold	and	worsen	basic	needs	
shortages.		
Note	 that	 I	 am	 not	 questioning	 the	 empirical	 non-cosmopolitan	 assumption,	 which	
claims	that	there	are	institutional	relations	of	the	relevant	(strong)	kind	in	the	domestic	
context,	but	not	in	the	global	context	(I	grant	this	assumption	for	the	sake	of	argument).	
Rather,	 I	 am	 claiming	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 strong	 institutions	 on	 an	 international	 level	
coupled	with	the	strong,	institutionalized	powers	of	nation-states	by	their	very	existence	
creates	and	upholds	 severe	poverty,	which	opposes	 the	 fulfillment	of	basic	obligations.	
Therefore,	 conceding	 facts	 about	 the	 lack	 of	 international	 coercion	 and	 reciprocal	
relations,	inequality	between	states,	and	state	power	(as	institutional	non-cosmopolitans	
do)	 renders	 the	 basic	 needs	 deficiencies	 caused	 by	 these	 facts	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	
normative	principles—and	thus,	beyond	normative	political	action	guidance.		
If	we	take	the	 international	system	of	 institutions	without	 allowing	 for	 radical	 changes,	
fulfilling	basic	needs	in	any	near-future	sense	of	the	term	seems	exceedingly	hampered	by	
major	obstacles	for	it	to	constitute	action-guidance	in	any	real	sense	of	the	word	–	and,	
importantly,	for	it	to	do	so	in	the	sense	in	which	institutionally	conservative	theorists	use	
this	 word	 to	 distinguish	 themselves	 from	 cosmopolitans.	 Institutionally	 conservative	
non-cosmopolitans,	 then,	 must	 give	 up	 (or	 severely	 weaken)	 either	 their	 institutional	
conservatism	 or	 give	 up	 rectifying	 threats	 to	 the	 basic	 needs	 fulfillment,	 which	 are	
inherent	in	the	current	institutional	setup.	
The	more	general	issue,	then,	is	that	institutionally	conservative	approaches	have	a	built-
in	tendency	to	construct	normative	principles	which	overlook	injustices	inherent	in	the	
current	 institutional	 system	 –	 and	 more	 importantly,	 which	 are	 not	 action-guiding	
regarding	 the	 rectification	 of	 such	 systemic	 injustices.	 Institutionally	 conservative	
theorists	might	defend	 themselves	 against	 this	 claim	by	noting	 that	 their	 accounts	 are	
often	 relatively	 critical	 of	 current	 institutions.	 Furthermore,	 many	 institutionally	
conservative	 theorists	 do	 not	 agree	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 international	 institutions	 and	 the	
system	of	nation	states	plays	as	large	a	part	in	the	creation	and	perpetuation	of	poverty	
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as	 claimed	 above.	 Thus,	 there	 is	 some	 disagreement	 about	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	
current	 world	 order	 is	 producing	 these	 injustices	 (and	which	 baseline	 should	 be	 used	
when	 deciding	 this	 question)	 (Risse	 2005,	 2012,	 294-297). 20 	But	 the	 point	 is	 more	
fundamental	 than	 this;	 even	 relatively	 critical	 versions	 of	 institutional	 conservatism	
suffer	 from	 the	 systemic	 defect	 that	 they	 cannot	 guide	 us	 toward	 the	 alleviation	 of	
injustices	which	can	only	be	overcome	by	dismantling	the	institutions	in	question.	21	
The	 objection	 concerning	 the	 institutionally	 conservative	 obliviousness	 to	 injustices	
inherent	 in	 the	 current	 system	 is	 certainly	 important,	 and	one	of	which	 institutionally	
conservative	theorists	(and	their	critics)	should	be	wary	–	and	this	is	the	case	outside	the	
debate	on	global	justice,	as	well.	Furthermore,	as	Laura	Valentini	(2009)	has	pointed	out	
(in	 the	 context	 of	 Rawls’	 theory	 of	 international	 justice),	 besides	 overlooking	 such	
systemic	 injustices	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists’	 principles	 may	 even	 serve	 to	
obscure	these	problems	by	leaving	the	reader	with	the	impression	that	the	social	context	
is	unproblematic	or	neutral.	Thus,	 one	might	 say,	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	
are	not	only	creating	principles	which	cannot	guide	action	towards	rectifying	important	
injustices,	 they	 may	 be	 sustaining	 their	 continued	 concealment.	 Institutionally	
conservative	theorists,	more	generally,	then,	may	be	susceptible	to	overlooking	inherent	
systemic	injustices	–	and	may	even	be	charged	with	(unintentionally)	naturalizing	these.		
B.	INSTITUTIONAL	CONSERVATISM	WITH	MEDIUM	LEVELS	OF	INSTITUTIONAL	ADJUSTABILITY	
As	 mentioned,	 the	 degree	 of	 deference	 to	 the	 current	 institutional	 setup	 required	 by	
institutionally	conservative	theorists	to	be	action-guiding	is	not	entirely	clear.	Instead	of	
assuming	that	no	radical	changes	are	allowed,	I	will	now	undertake	a	similar	analysis	as	
above	 but	 assuming	 that	 some	 radical	 changes	 are	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 action-guiding	
theory.	 That	 is,	 radical	 changes	 which	 are	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 maintaining	 a	 strong	
system	of	nation-states	and	no	(similarly)	strong,	international	institutions.	Although,	I	
think	 most	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 are	 most	 plausibly	 read	 as	
recommending	 an	 approach	 which	 tracks	 the	 current	 system	 of	 states	 and	 (lack	 of)	
international	 institutions	 to	 quite	 a	 significant	 degree,	 most	 of	 them	 would	 allow	 for	
some	 changes	 to	 this	 system	 as	 well.	 Not	 least,	most	 institutionally	 conservative	 non-
cosmopolitans	believe	 that	 states	 should	 act	 in	 a	non-exploitative	way	 in	 international	
relations	of	trade—although,	again,	they	should	do	so	from	within	the	framework	of	the	
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current	 institutional	system	(Blake	2013,	99,	 121,	 128-129,	Kurjanska	&	Risse	2008,	 James	
2005,	Risse	2008,	2012,	part	3	–	and,	especially,	James	2012).		
So,	while	the	import	and	strength	of	nation-states	(and	the	lack	of	strong	institutions	in	
the	international	realm)	should	be	held	constant,	the	way	they	interact	and	relate	should	
not	 and,	 thus,	 could	 change.	 So	 although	 none	 of	 them	 would	 allow	 for	 the	 kind	 of	
institutional	changes	which	would	entail	escaping	all	of	 the	mentioned	threats	to	basic	
needs	 inherent	 in	 the	 international	 system,	 escaping	 some	 of	 them	 seems	 within	 the	
scope	 of	 institutional	 conservatism	 (and	 others	 are	 not,	 as	 mentioned,	 thought	 to	 be	
actually	inherent	in	the	system).			
For	 the	 sake	 of	 argument,	 however,	 we	 may	 assume	 that	 such	 radical	 change	 to	
international	 cooperation	 falls	 within	 the	 notion	 of	 adjusting	 theories	 to	 institutional	
facts	 –	 that	 is,	 principles	 can	 still	 be	 action-guiding	 in	 the	 institutionally	 conservative	
sense	while	recommending	such	changes.	Let	us	assume,	then,	an	 international	system	
of	 institutions	 that	 did	 not	 have	 the	 undesirable	 consequences	 outlined	 above.	
Presumably,	even	in	this	imagined	world	of	less	unjust	international	institutions,	not	all	
basic	 obligations	would	 be	 fulfilled	 –	 seeing	 as	 non-cosmopolitans,	 generally	 and	pace	
Pogge,	claim	that	international	institutions	cannot	account	for	the	extent	and	severity	of	
poverty	(Risse	2005,	2012,	294-297).22		
In	 a	world	 of	 an	 unjust	 international	 order	without	 inherent	 systemic	 injustices,	 then,	
there	would	 still	 be	 basic	 needs	 that	were	 left	 unfulfilled.	 I	 contend	 that,	 even	 in	 this	
much	 improved	 scenario	 (or,	 this	 less	 conservative	 understanding	 of	 their	 notion	 of	
adjusting	 normative	 theories	 to	 institutional	 facts),	 institutional	 conservatism	 would	
conflict	with	 this	 goal.	This	 is	because	empirically	 likely	 routes	of	 reaching	 the	goal	of	
fulfilling	 basic	 obligations	would	 require	 changing	 the	 institutional	 setup	 in	ways	 that	
are	beyond	the	scope	of	their	approach.	The	second	way,	in	which	the	dilemma	occurs,	
then,	 is	 that	 institutional	 conservatism	 cannot	 guide	 action	 toward	plausible	 routes	 to	
coming	to	fulfill	such	obligations.		
Consider	 the	 quotidian	 observation	 that	 we	 do	 not	 make	 it	 voluntary	 for	 people	 to	
respect	 the	 law	 domestically	 and,	 say,	 pay	 their	 taxes.	 Rather,	 we	 ensure	 compliance	
through	a	system	of	coercion	(or,	at	least,	coercively	backed	incentives).	This,	of	course,	
is	 because	we	 are	well	 aware	 that	 if	 compliance	 is	 optional,	 there	 is	no	 assurance	 that	
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people	will	actually	comply	(and	indeed	we	have	good	reason	to	think	they	might	not).	If	
we	 want	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 wealthy	 states	 comply	 with	 their	 basic	 obligations	 to	
foreigners,	then,	we	would	need	some	way	of	coercing	them	to	do	so	(or,	at	least,	provide	
incentives	for	compliance).23	To	ensure	the	fulfillment	of	basic	obligations,	then,	a	strong	
case	exists	for	creating	global	institutions	with	greater	powers	of	coercion,	coordination,	
and	incentivization	if	we	wish	to	meet	the	goal	of	alleviating	global	poverty	(Caney	2005,	
159-164).		
Institutionally	 conservative	 theorists,	 of	 course,	 cannot	 guide	 us	 toward	 this	 solution	
since	 their	 principles	 are	 developed	on	 the	 assumption	 that	 no	 such	 institutions	 exist,	
and	 that	 this	will	 continue	 to	 be	 the	 case	 (since	 such	 constraints	 are	 needed	 for	 their	
principles	to	be	action-guiding).	Risse,	for	example,	explicitly	rejects	the	idea	of	a	global	
organization	with	coercive	powers	charged	with	 the	sole	 task	of	ensuring	development	
(Risse	 2012,	 357-358).	 But	 if	 international	 institutional	 coercion	 to	 a	 degree	 that	 is	
significantly	 greater	 than	 the	 current	 level	 is	 needed	 to	 ensure	 that	 basic	 needs	
deficiencies	are	alleviated	within	a	reasonable	timeframe	(or	is,	at	least,	a	component	in	
the	most	plausible	 solutions),	non-cosmopolitans	 should	wish	 to	guide	us	 toward	such	
arrangements,	 and	are	 faced	with	a	dilemma	 if	 their	methodology	prevents	 them	 from	
doing	so.	In	other	words,	institutionally	conservative	theorists	must	either	conclude	that	
basic	 needs	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 fulfilled,	 and,	 thus,	 refrain	 from	 trying	 to	 guide	 people	
toward	their	fulfilment,	or	reevaluate	their	notion	of	what	can	and	cannot	be	done.	
Furthermore,	 one	may	 note	 that	 the	 incentives	 of	 the	 nation-state	 system	 are	 skewed	
against	 increases	 in	 global	 redistribution.	 Since	 governments	 are	 only	 accountable	 to	
their	own	citizens,	they	have	no	enticement	to	cater	to	the	basic	needs	of	poor	foreigners	
(Caney	2005,	169)	—except,	of	course,	the	cosmopolitan	benevolence	of	their	electorate	
(which	 has,	 so	 far,	 proved	 a	 woefully	 inadequate	 source	 of	 poverty	 relief).	 But,	
importantly,	not	 taking	 the	 interests	 of	poor	 foreigners	 sufficiently	 into	 account	 is	not	
just	a	feature	of	the	current	system	of	nation	states,	but	would	be	a	feature	of	any	system	
of	 nation	 states.	 It	 is	 an	 inherent	 problem	 that	 will	 persist	 in	 any	 institutionally	
conservative	 approach,	 which	 concedes	 the	 system	 of	 strong	 nation	 states	 and	 weak	
global	institutions.	Some	institutionally	conservative	theorists	are	aware	of	this	issue,	but	
do	 not	 think	 it	 justifies	 modifying	 the	 setup	 (Risse	 2012,	 341-344).	 The	main	 route	 to	
counteracting	the	nationalist	bias	pointed	out	by	development	theorists,	however,	seems	
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to	be	to	set	up	global	institutions	with	greater	public	accountability	and	actual,	coercive	
powers	(Bohman	2004).	But	institutionally	conservative	theorists	cannot	point	us	in	that	
direction	and	fail	to	provide	us	with	other	routes	to	overcoming	this	key	issue.	
Related	 to	 the	 former	 point,	 the	 current	 system	 of	 strong	 nation-states	 and	 relatively	
weak	 international	 institutions	 gives	 powerful	 incentives	 to	 domestic	 politicians	 to	
ignore	 the	 needs	 and	 rights	 of	 deprived	 foreigners	 (Bueno	 de	 Mesquita	 2011).	
Importantly,	 this	means	 that	many	development	projects	and	aid	 strategies	are	 shaped	
by	national	economic	and	strategic	interests	 instead	of	by	the	needs	of	the	recipients.24	
Indeed,	 many	 development	 theorists	 hold	 that	 such	 national	 biases	 and	 the	 short-
sightedness	that	comes	with	being	bound	to	domestic	election	cycles	are	primary	reasons	
that	development	aid	has	failed	at	achieving	the	goal	of	global	basic	need	fulfillment25	–	
development	aid	fails,	then,	because	it	is	nationally	founded	rather	than	internationally	
or	globally	founded.		
Relatedly,	 as	 Daniel	 Weinstock	 (1999)	 notes,	 an	 important	 function	 of	 political	
institutions	 is	 to	 give	 content	 and	 direction	 to	 our	 intuitive	 feeling	 that	 we	 owe	
something	to	the	less	fortunate.	Without	such	institutions	on	a	global	scale,	one	might	
claim,	our	cross-border	obligations	will	 remain	 indeterminate	and	unclear.	Note	again,	
that	the	problems	noted	in	this	paragraph	are	not	ones	that	are	confined	to	the	current	
institutional	system,	but	ones	that	would	persist	in	any	global	system	built	around	strong	
nation	states	and	much	weaker	international	institutions.	This	is	an	important	objection	
to	James’	argument	that	a	radically	different	global	institutional	setup	cannot	provide	the	
necessary	 assurance	 for	 the	 agents	 seeking	 to	 cooperate	 within	 its	 framework.	
Weinstock’s	argument,	then,	can	be	read	as	claiming	that	such	assurance	can	never	exist	
pre-institutionally.	 Rather,	 institutions	 must	 be	 constructed	 first	 and	 obligational	
content	and	direction	–	and	the	ensuing	mutual	assurance	–	will	follow.	
In	response	to	these	problems	of	structural	bias	and	indeterminate	obligations,	creating	
international	 institutions,	 the	 leaders	 of	which	were	 accountable	 to	 all	 those	 to	whom	
basic	obligations	were	owed,	 seems	 to	be	one	of	 the	most	promising	 routes,	 as	 several	
theorists	have	noted	(Axelsen	2013,	468-469;	Bohman	2004,	342,	Caney	2005,	 169,	Held	
1995,	Laborde	2010,	52-57).	Again,	institutionally	conservative	principles	cannot	guide	us	
toward	this	solution	even	though	non-cosmopolitans	should	want	 to	do	so,	given	their	
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wish	to	eradicate	basic	need	deprivation.	Their	institutional	conservatism,	then,	renders	
these	 very	 promising	 routes	 to	 progress	 inaccessible	 given	 that	 they	 are	 by	 their	
definition	not	action-guiding.	
Moreover,	alleviating	basic	needs	deficiencies	will	very	often	require	developing	much-
improved	 access	 to	 different	 public	 goods	 such	 as	 electricity,	 infrastructure,	 health	
coverage,	public	administration,	and	law	enforcement.	However,	the	countries	in	which	
the	poorest	billion	people	of	the	world	reside	often	have	economies	which	are	so	small	
that	supplying	their	citizens	with	these	goods,	given	the	scale	and	start-up	costs	of	doing	
so,	 seems	 like	 an	 impossible	 task.	 Because	 of	 this,	 they	 are	 thoroughly	 dependent	 on	
international	 institutional	 cooperation	 to	 accomplish	 these	 feats	 (Collier	 2010,	 189-191).	
Institutionally	 conservative	 theorists,	 who	 take	 the	 lack	 of	 strong,	 international	
institutions	as	a	pretheoretical	fact,	cannot	guide	political	action	toward	this	possibility,	
and	thus,	make	this	important	development	toward	fulfilling	basic	needs	inaccessible.		
Institutional	non-cosmopolitans,	thus,	cannot	guide	political	action	toward	significantly	
strengthening	 international	 institutional	 capacities;	 yet	 this,	 I	 claim,	 represents	 one	 of	
the	 most	 plausible	 routes	 (and,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 alternative	 route	 from	
institutionally	conservative	theorists,	the	most	plausible	route)	to	progress	with	respect	
to	 meeting	 basic	 needs	 obligations.	 Even	 if	 we	 allow	 for	 significant	 changes	 to	 the	
current	 institutional	 system	 (much	 greater	 ones	 than	 their	 theories	 seem	 to	 allow),	 in	
order	to	overcome	the	inherent	injustices	noted	in	the	first	section,	non-cosmopolitans	
will	 still	be	 left	with	a	very	 important	 set	of	 threats	 to	ensuring	basic	need	 fulfillment.	
Namely	those	problems,	which	are	part	of	the	system	of	nation	states	qua	nation	states	–	
and	these	constitute	considerable	obstacles	to	achieving	their	professed	goal.		
Note	that	institutionally	conservative	theorists	might,	as	Risse	(2012,	293)	does,	point	to	
the	 fact	 that	 ‘Development	 economics	 remains	 a	 discipline	 with	 substantial	
disagreement.’	 This,	 however,	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 allow	 them	 to	 escape	 the	 dilemma.	
Even	if	development	theorists	do,	indeed,	disagree	on	the	content	of	the	precise	recipes	
that	will	help	countries	achieve	a	flourishing	economy,	there	is	widespread	agreement	on	
what	 is	 not	 working.	 And	 that	 is	 exactly	 the	 lack	 of	 international,	 institutional	
cooperation	 and	 coordination	 and	 the	 tendency	 for	 wealthy	 nation-states	 to	 pursue	
strategic,	 short-termist	 and	 national	 interests	 instead	 of	 actual	 poverty	 alleviation.	 In	
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other	words,	even	if	we	take	Risse’s	‘sweeping	objection’	about	the	epistemic	uncertainty	
about	a	world	without	strong	nation-states	into	account	(or,	for	that	matter,	James’	claim	
that	 transitioning	 to	 such	 a	world	would	be	met	with	 assurance	problems),	we	 should	
balance	 this	 against	 the	 epistemic	 certainty	 of	 the	 obstacles	 inherent	 in	 a	 world	with	
strong	 nation-states.	 And	 if	 we	 take	 the	 goal	 of	 basic	 need	 alleviation	 seriously	 (as	
institutionally	 conservative	 non-cosmopolitans	 supposedly	 do),	 this	 should	 trouble	 us	
greatly.	
Institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 might	 still	 reply,	 however,	 that	 while	 significant	
changes	to	the	global	institutional	setup	are,	indeed,	necessary	for	getting	to	a	world	in	
which	basic	needs	are	met	and	global	poverty	 is	 eradicated,	 such	changes	are	 far	 from	
those	needed	to	ensure	global	equality	or	universal	human	flourishing.	The	institutional	
changes	needed,	they	might	say,	to	ensure	basic	needs	fulfillment	are	ones	that	human	
agents	can	realize,	while	those	needed	to	ensure	global	equality	are	not.26	In	other	words,	
proposing	global	basic	obligations	is	action-guiding,	whereas	proposing	more	demanding	
ones	 is	not.	But	 it	should	be	remembered,	 first	of	all,	 that	 the	principles	 institutionally	
conservative	theorists	would	have	to	propose,	if	they	are	to	meet	the	challenges	outlined	
above,	would	look	very	different	from	what	is	now	being	recommended.	They	would	be	
less	concessive	of	the	soft	 facts	of	 the	global	 institutional	order,	which,	 in	turn,	 lessens	
the	methodological	distance	from	aspirational	theories.		
Second,	 institutionalizing	 the	 reforms	 needed	 for	 basic	 needs	 fulfillment	 would	
conceivably	push	the	limits	of	feasibility	considerably.	Principles	that	seem	utopian	and	
out	 of	 reach	 for	 an	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorist	 under	 the	 current	 institutional	
order	would	plausibly	look	more	action-guiding	and	accessible	under	a	different	one.	In	
particular,	conceding	the	global	institutional	order	in	a	world	in	which	key	international	
institutions	 were	 significantly	 stronger	 and	 the	 capacities	 of	 wealthy	 nation-states	 in	
enforcing	their	agenda	were	decidedly	diminished	would	allow	for	a	very	different,	much	
more	 radical,	 content	 than	 now.	 On	 this	 background,	 cosmopolitans	 might	 argue	 (as	
Pablo	 Gilabert,	 for	 example,	 does)	 that	 we	 have	 an	 obligation	 to	 get	 ourselves	 to	 a	
situation	in	which	global	equality	is	a	feasible	aim.27	Thus,	we	have	a	duty	to	ensure	the	
institutional	 reforms	needed	 for	universal	 basic	needs	 fulfillment	partly	 because	 global	
equality	 is	 a	 feasible	 goal	 from	 there.	And	 this,	 even	on	 an	 institutionally	 conservative	
account	is	an	action-guiding	principle.	
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5.	Conclusion:	Action-Guidance	and	Other	Values	
In	 the	 above,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 may	 find	
themselves	 in	 a	 dilemma	 caused	 by	 a	 discrepancy	 between	 their	 approach	 and	 their	
normative	 commitments.	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 this	 was	 the	 case	 for	 non-cosmopolitans,	
who	 cannot	 coherently	 maintain	 their	 commitment	 to	 alleviating	 basic	 needs	
deficiencies	 and	 their	 institutionally	 conservative	 notion	 of	 action	 guidance	 –	 even	 if	
understood	 in	a	 less	 static	manner.	Thus,	 they	are	 faced	with	a	dilemma	because	 their	
institutional	 conservatism	 makes	 them	 oblivious	 to	 injustices	 regarding	 basic	 needs	
inherent	in	the	current	setup	of	soft	facts	or	renders	the	most	promising	routes	toward	
meeting	 basic	 obligations	 beyond	 the	 action-guidance	 scope	 of	 their	 principles.	 To	
determine	 whether	 these	 arguments	 are	 ultimately	 persuasive	 and	 whether	
institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 in	 other	 fields	 are	 caught	 in	 a	 similar	 dilemma,	
more	must	be	said	–	but	that	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	paper.		
Now,	both	institutionally	conservative	theorists	and	idealists	(and	everyone	in	between)	
must	consider	both	the	feasibility	and	desirability	of	achieving	their	normative	aims.	As	I	
have	 argued	 above,	 however,	 institutionally	 conservative	 theorists	 face	 a	 genuine	
dilemma	 caused	 by	 their	 relatively	 static	 view	 of	 soft	 facts	 being	 irreconcilable	 with	
guiding	 action	 towards	 the	 realization	 of	 their	 normative	 commitments.	 The	
institutionally	conservative	arguments,	 in	other	words,	treat	radical	change	in	soft	facts	
as	 a	 constraint	 on	 normative	 principles	 –	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition	 that	 normative	
principles	must	live	up	to.28	But,	while	feasibility	or	action-guidance	may	indeed	function	
as	a	constraint	regarding	hard	facts,	the	above	analysis	has	shown	that	this	is	not	the	case	
for	soft	facts.29	Here,	action-guidance	is	better	understood	as	one	value	to	consider	along	
with	other	 important	ones,	 such	as	 the	desirability	of	 the	outcome,	 the	 cost	of	 getting	
there,	 and	 the	 uncertainty	 and	 stability	 of	 the	 solution.30	When	 it	 comes	 to	 soft	 facts	
(such	as	institutions),	in	the	words	of	Holly	Lawford-Smith	(2013,	254	[emphasis	added]);	
‘the	better	thing	to	say	is	not	that	feasibility	is	required,	but	that	feasibility	matters.’	And	
this	 is	because	 it	matters	how	costly	 it	 is	 to	achieve	an	outcome	–	but	 it	 is	not	all	 that	
matters.31	
Institutional	 conservatives	 should	 say	 instead,	 then,	 that	 ‘soft	 fact	 feasibility’	 (or,	 for	
Risse	 and	 James,	 soft	 fact	 empirical	 uncertainty	 and	 assurance)	 is	 a	weighty	 concern	 –	
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and	one	that	is	too	often	underappreciated	by	more	idealist	theorists.	But	moving	from	
treating	 action-guidance	 as	 a	 constraint	 to	 treating	 it	 as	 one	 important	 feature	 of	
normative	 theorizing	 (however	 weighty)	 would	 mean	 having	 to	 weigh	 feasibility	
considerations	 against	 the	moral	 deplorability	 of	 the	 status	quo32	–	 and	 looking	 at	 this	
status	quo	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	billions	who	are	poor	and	deprived,	a	radically	
different,	 institutional	 setup	may	well	 be	 the	 better	 option,	 even	 if	 it	 seems	 uncertain	
and	costly	to	achieve.	
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17	In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Leif	Wenar	 argues	 that	 the	 international	 system	 of	 property	 rights	
effectively	 impoverishes	 citizens	 in	 poor	 countries	 and	 upholds	 powerful	 incentives	 to	
keep	it	this	way	(Wenar	2008).		
18	See	also	Ypi	2012,	 115-127,	 for	an	argument	along	these	 lines	drawing	on	the	notion	of	
‘positional	goods.’	
19	See	Ronzoni	2009	on	why	international	institutions	must	ensure	 ‘background	justice’.	
See	Collier	2007,	159-160,	for	an	empirically	based	argument	to	this	effect.	
20	See	also,	Miller	2007,	238-247,	Rawls	1999,	108		
21	In	 a	 similar	 vein,	Valentini	 2011	 affirms	 that	 ‘social	 liberal	principles	designed	via	 the	
interpretive	 approach	 [starting	 from	 practices	 as	 they	 are]	 are	 bound	 to	 overlook	 the	
justice-based	interests	of	some	persons,’	416.	
22	See	also,	Miller	2007,	238-247,	Rawls	1999,	108.	James	seems	to	agree	more	with	Pogge’s	
analysis	(James	2012,	117-120)	but	does	not	think	that	alleviating	the	highlighted	problems	
with	the	international	structure	would	render	the	world	just	(James	2012,	12).		
23	The	failure	of	the	state	system	in	establishing	more	demanding	standards	with	respect	
to	carbon	emissions	serves	as	a	clear	example	of	 this	problem	(and	this	 is	even	though	
climate	change	affects	the	wealthy	countries	 in	a	much	more	direct	way	than	failing	to	
fulfil	basic	needs	does).	
24	See	Peter	 J.	 Schraeder	 et	 al.	 1998,	 294-323,	 for	 an	 interesting	 comparison	of	different	
aid	programs.	
25	For	two	influential	versions	of	this	argument,	see	Bolton	2007	and	Easterly	2006.	
26	I	am	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	pressing	this	objection.	
27	See	Gilabert	2012,	chap.	7.	
27	
	
																																																																																																																																																														
28 	See	 Gheaus	 2013,	 for	 an	 illuiminating	 discussion	 of	 considering	 feasibility	 as	 a	
constraint	on	justice.	
29 	See,	 however,	 Gheaus	 2013,	 454-456,	 for	 reasons	 why	 even	 hard	 facts	 should	 be	
considered	in	a	dynamic	manner.	
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31	I	 am	 grateful	 for	 the	 input	 of	 two	 anonymous	 reviewers	 and	 Richard	 Bellamy	 for	
helping	me	clarify	these	points.	
32	See	Gilabert	2012,	248-254,	for	this	and	other	important	considerations	in	the	process	
of	such	weighing.	
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